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Introduction and summary
Many European countries have laws mandating mini-
mum paid vacations and holidays. The U.S. does not.
The number of mandated days has risen over time
and exceeds the levels taken by the average worker
in the U.S. Over the past three decades, annual hours
worked in Europe have fallen relative to hours in the
U.S. Is there a connection among these phenomena?
To address this question, one must first consider
how work hours are determined, as well as the role of
vacation policy at the level of the firm and at the level
of the country. We summarize evidence for the U.S.
that firms care about work hours and use firm-wide
vacation policies as a way to regulate them and dis-
cuss theories of why, despite worker heterogeneity, they
choose uniform vacation policies rather than negotiat-
ing leave with individuals. We discuss possible economic
rationales for vacation laws and present empirical
evidence on whether they affect annual work hours.
We also review the sparse literature on the evolution
of vacation policy at the firm level and the country
level during the twentieth century to obtain insight into
the extent to which the laws may be viewed as exog-
enous with respect to labor supply preferences and
other factors that determine work hours.
The heart of the article is a regression analysis of
the relationship between the number of weeks of legally
mandated paid vacation time and average annual hours.1
Such an analysis is needed to help sort out the causal
effect of the law and because workers and firms re-
spond to the laws by adjusting hours per week and
secondary job holding. Most of the analysis uses data
for several European countries and the U.S. for various
years between 1979 and 1999. A simple regression of
annual hours on mandated vacation weeks shows that
an additional week of vacation mandated by law is asso-
ciated with 26.8 fewer hours worked annually. When
we control simultaneously for the year and for the
country, we find that an additional week of legislated
paid vacation results in 51.9 fewer hours worked per
year. Given that usual hours per week for full-time
workers in the European countries in our sample (ex-
cluding Norway) averaged 40.2 in 1998, this estimate
implies that mandating an extra week of paid vacation
translates more than one for one into a reduction in
weeks worked, although one cannot statistically reject
a coefficient of 40. As we explain below, this result
should be regarded with caution because it is driven
by a relatively small number of within-country law
changes, although it is robust to extending the sample
to include hours and vacation laws from the early 1950s.
The estimate falls to about 35 hours per year when we
introduce separate time trends for the U.S. and the
United Kingdom or estimate the model using only
countries that have vacation laws.
Overall, our analysis suggests that at least part of
the relationship between the laws and hours is causal
and that workers and firms don’t fully circumvent the
law through changes in hours per week or through
multiple job holding. Our results also imply that dif-
ferences in the laws account for a substantial portion
of the difference between the U.S. and Europe in an-
nual hours per worker. They cannot answer the deeper
question of whether the laws are a harmful constraint
on individual choice or a solution to a market failure
in the determination of work hours.20 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
In the next section, we discuss the existing theories
that are relevant to the question of the effect of vacation
laws on annual hours worked. Then, we review the litera-
ture on the evolution of vacation policy. We discuss the
data and econometric specification for the study. Then,
we present our analysis of the effects of vacation laws.
Determination of work hours and
a theory of vacation policy
Employer regulation of work hours
One cannot talk sensibly about paid leave policies
without first discussing the forces that determine work
hours. Empirical research on work hours is dominated
by the massive labor supply literature, most of which
assumes that people choose hours at a parametric wage.2
Cogan (1981), Hanoch (1980), and subsequent studies
have modified the basic labor supply model framework
to accommodate fixed costs, so that worker preferences
and budget parameters influence the form in which
work hours are packaged.3 However, casual empiricism
suggests that firms have strong preferences about em-
ployee hours. There is a good basis in theory for be-
lieving this to be the case. In particular, the models of
Ehrenberg (1971), Lewis (1969), Rosen (1969), and
Deardorf and Stafford (1976) emphasize the role of
technological considerations, including startup costs,
fatigue, and hiring and training costs that are fixed per
employee. They also consider nonlinearities in com-
pensation that are induced by fringe benefits, payroll
taxes, and overtime pay, as well as the costs of coordi-
nating workers who work different hours. Consequent-
ly, both average output per hour and the average full
cost per hour of employing someone depend on hours
worked per week and weeks worked per year. Since
firms will prefer schedules that maximize the difference
between output and cost, theory suggests that in many
cases workers are not free to choose how much to work
at a fixed wage or even at a wage that depends on
hours. Altonji and Paxson (1986) and recent studies
by Martinez-Granado (1999) and Senesky (2000) pro-
vide strong evidence that this is the case by showing
that the variance of changes in hours per week, weeks
per year, and hours per year is much stronger across
jobs than within the job. This evidence suggests that
work time is, to an important extent, a job-specific
phenomenon.
A test based on a comparison of hours changes
associated with quits and layoffs in Altonji and Paxson
(1986), as well as a substantial literature using self-re-
ported measures of unemployment, underemployment,
and overemployment (for example, Ham, 1982 and
1986; Kahn and Lang, 1988 and 1992; and Altonji and
Paxson, 1988) suggests that workers face demand
constraints that they cannot fully avoid by changing jobs.
Studies of the labor market for older workers have
stressed restrictions on changing to part-time status with
one’s current employer, as well as a large wage penalty
associated with giving up a full-time job for part-time
work in another firm. (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1983
and 1984; Berkovic and Stern, 1991; Hurd, 1996; and
Elder, 2000). In summary, restrictions on choice of
hours in a given job appear to be a central feature of
the labor market.
Firms regulate hours per day by setting work sched-
ules. They regulate days of work by establishing fixed
holidays, paid and unpaid vacation and personal days
(hereafter, vacation days), and provisions for excused
absences due to illness or family considerations, per-
haps with pay. Strictly from a budget point of view, there
is no meaningful economic distinction between “paid”
and unpaid vacation. One can always adjust the wage
rate to achieve a given level of annual compensation
for a given amount of time worked over the year. How-
ever, adjusting time off without leaving an employment
relationship involves adjusting vacation days.
Are work hours efficient?
Given training costs, nonlinearities in the relation-
ship between work time and productivity, and com-
ponents of compensation and payroll taxes that are to
some degree fixed per employee, one would expect
firms to offer fixed hours/wage packages or perhaps
hours/wage menus that involve steep tradeoffs. Coor-
dination costs are a further inducement for the firm to
limit variation in work schedules and days off. Once
the facts that job search is costly and that workers and
jobs are tied bundles of characteristics are brought
into the picture, many additional features of the labor
market can be reconciled with the view that the distri-
bution of hours and wages is efficient given search costs.
These include survey evidence that some workers, par-
ticularly women with children and older workers, would
reduce work hours with their current employer if they
could reduce earnings and benefits proportionately,
while others would like to increase hours in their cur-
rent jobs. A worker may choose to continue in a job
that has a good hourly wage, good working conditions,
and is near home even if the hours are too long, be-
cause it is too difficult to find a job with more time
off that is also competitive in other dimensions.
In contrast, Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) and Landers
et al. (1996) provide specific examples of a broad class of
models in which 1) work preferences are heterogeneous
and unobserved by the firm and either directly influence
(through current and future effort levels or turnover
decisions) or are correlated with productivity; and21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
2) pay cannot be tied directly to the productivity of in-
dividual workers. The difficulty in matching pay to pro-
ductivity may arise because productivity is unobservable
or because it is hard to devise and enforce multi-period
contracts, particularly when turnover is a key issue.
The basic idea of the models is as follows. Condi-
tional on a set of variables that are observable to the
firm, worker preferences for hours are assumed to de-
pend positively on a characteristic d that varies across
workers. Firms have no direct information on the value
of d for a particular worker. Conditional on hours
worked N, the productivity of the worker is positively
related to d. The variation in productivity may reflect
quit behavior, effort levels, an association between d
and innate ability, health status, or human capital in-
vestment that is not observed by the firm, or other fac-
tors. Finally, productivity cannot be perfectly contracted
on, because it is not directly observable or because of
other considerations discussed in the employment
contracting and efficiency wage literatures.4 Abstract-
ing from characteristics of the worker that the firm
does observe, such as education and previous experi-
ence, pay will only be conditional on N. Competition
among firms and the distribution of worker types will
determine an earnings–hours locus (W(N), N) of points
that are equally profitable to firms and clear the mar-
ket for employment at each value of N. The value of
W will reflect the direct relationship between N and
productivity (through startup costs, fatigue, and so on)
and the average of the productivity characteristics of
workers who choose N. Workers with higher values
of d will choose higher values of N. Since productivity
depends positively on d, this will reinforce a relation-
ship between W and N. Wages for a given value of N
will adjust accordingly, with further shifts in supply
and demand for jobs offering N hours.
As Rebitzer and Taylor argue, the fact that workers
are essentially signaling productivity through their
choice of N may lead to an equilibrium in which hours
in the typical job are too long. Firms that offer more
time off may attract a lower-quality work force. The
gap in wages between jobs with long hours and short
hours may be larger than in the full information case.
The market for jobs with an intermediate value for N
may shrink, as few workers are interested in a contract
offering a moderate amount of time off at a wage that
is consistent with the average productivity of the
workers who would demand it.
Empirical testing of the effects of adverse selec-
tion on hours is in its infancy. A few implications of
the model do appear to be consistent with some basic
facts about vacation policy. In particular, Altonji and
Usui (2001) show that vacation leave is largely set
firm-wide with little latitude for negotiation. Job chang-
ers usually start at the bottom of the vacation/seniority
ladder at their new firm, regardless of the vacation on
their previous job. Since vacation time varies within
the firm based on seniority and vacations are not fully
synchronized, it is hard to explain the lack of worker
level bargaining with an appeal to coordination costs.
Further, the fact that vacation time increases with se-
niority is consistent with the possibility that concern
about adverse selection influences employer decisions
about work time requirements for two reasons. First,
a seniority-related delay in obtaining high levels of
vacation will discourage workers with low values of
d from taking a job in the first place, reducing the ad-
verse selection problem that the firm faces in offering
more vacation. Second, delay gives the firm time to
observe and weed out poor performers, further reduc-
ing the adverse selection problem.
Implications for vacation laws
What are the implications for vacation law policy?
From the point of view of the standard competitive
model of the labor market, vacation laws are hard to
defend.5 However, minimum vacation laws may be
welfare-improving if adverse selection is important
enough. Working in the opposite direction are the costs
of restricting choice when preferences for leave are
heterogeneous. (This heterogeneity led to the market
failure in the first place.) We conjecture that the net
social benefit of the laws depends on the importance
of unobserved heterogeneity relative to observed het-
erogeneity and the strength of the association between
leisure preferences and productivity, as well as heter-
ogeneity in the employer preferences for hours.
Recent research in psychology and economics pro-
vides alternative rationales for minimum vacation laws.
The basic idea is that because of problems of commit-
ment, time inconsistency, and consumption externali-
ties, society may arrive at an equilibrium in which
people work more and consume more than is efficient.
Laws that regulate how much people work may have
benefits in such a situation. However, given heterogene-
ity in skill levels, leisure preferences, and consumption
needs, this comes at a cost.
A final argument would revolve around health ex-
ternalities. Suppose that time off from work improves
physical or mental health and that the costs of illness
are borne in part by society. In this case, a standard
externalities argument might justify state intervention.
Allen (1969) argues that the impetus for paid vaca-
tions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
came from employers, who often emphasized benefi-
cial effects of rest on productivity, in part because of22 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
health benefits.6  Not all of these benefits, if they ac-
tually exist, would be internal to the firm and worker.
We are skeptical that social regulation of vacation
weeks does more good than harm. Nevertheless, it is
interesting to examine the extent to which vacation
laws actually affect work hours and account for cross-
country differences in hours. A key issue in address-
ing these questions is the extent to which the laws simply
reflect differences over time and across countries in
other factors that have determined weeks of vacation
and annual hours. To get some perspective on this,
we briefly discuss the evolution of vacation leave in
the U.S. and Europe.
A brief history of vacation leave
Paid vacation time is a relatively recent develop-
ment in Europe and the U.S. Allen (1969) provides a
detailed history for the U.S. that we draw upon heavi-
ly here. Prior to 1940, much of the initiative for vaca-
tions came from management, who saw vacations as
a way to increase productivity, reduce turnover, and
attract and keep workers during tight labor markets,
such as the 1920s, when vacation policies spread rap-
idly. Indeed, Allen characterizes 1910–40 as “the man-
agement phase” of the vacation movement in the U.S.
As evidence that firms cared about the productivity bene-
fits of restful vacations, she notes that vacation plans
often prohibited employees from taking short-term em-
ployment or from deferring vacation time. Some firms
built camps where employees could go during vacations.
Paid vacations were first provided to managerial
personnel on a limited scale in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. They gradually spread to office personnel and then
to salaried foremen and supervisors. Vacations were
more prevalent among more highly skilled employees
with seniority in more stable positions. They were also
more common for jobs in which the work could be
shifted over time. Allen uses data from U.S. Department
of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports
to estimate that the percentage of salaried workers
who received paid vacations exceeded 10 percent in
1900, 33 percent by WWI, and 80 percent by 1935.
Vacations spread more slowly to hourly wage work-
ers, for whom management believed the productivity
benefits to be smaller and less likely to be captured by
the firm because of higher turnover rates. At the end
of WWI, about 5 percent of manufacturing firms had
permanent vacation plans for hourly wage earners. The
plans spread during the 1920s, along with more for-
mal personnel policies, other fringe benefits, and the
view that vacations brought productivity benefits for
blue-collar workers as well as managerial and super-
visory employees. They declined during the early
years of the Great Depression in the face of economic
pressure and diminished concerns about recruiting and
turnover costs. (For data on the prevalence of nonwage
benefits, including vacations during the 1920s and
1930s, see Moriguchi, 2002). Allen estimates vacation
coverage of wage earners at about 5 percent in 1920
and about 10 percent in 1930. Coverage declined in
the early 1930s but was more than 10 percent in 1935.
Allen argues that at least through the 1930s, paid
vacation was a low priority for workers and for unions.
With the rapid growth of unions after 1935, vacation
plans spread. By 1940, vacation coverage for hourly
employees had grown to 50 percent. However, the pri-
mary concerns of unions were recognition and higher
wages, not increased paid vacation time. Allen points
out that the most unionized industries in the 1930s and
1940s had the shortest paid vacations, and that these
paid vacation plans were still initiated by managers,
not unions.
During WWII, paid vacation spread, but often as
a way to increase compensation in a tight labor market
under wage controls administered by the National War
Labor Board. It is interesting to note that management
initially opposed recommendations from the Office of
Production Management that firms making essential war
materials provide vacation bonuses in place of time
off. The employers were concerned that dropping va-
cations would lower productivity.7 Allen discusses the
fact that workers and unions began to demand paid va-
cation during this period, in part as a way to increase
compensation within the strictures of the Labor Board.8
After the war years, paid vacation came to be seen
by employees as a standard part of the employment
package. However, Allen asserts that the value placed
by employers on vacation time may be seen in post-
war contract negotiations that forbade workers from
taking pay in lieu of vacation or from skipping vaca-
tion in one year in order to have a longer vacation the
following year.9
In Europe, unions and workers played a more cen-
tral role in the spread of vacation time. In the 1930s
paid vacation time became as important an issue to
workers and trade unions as the eight-hour day and
the 48-hour week had been in the first quarter of the
twentieth century. Pressures by trade unions resulted
in paid vacation legislation in many European coun-
tries. Blyton (1985), Allen (1968),10 and Green and
Potepan (1988) emphasize the importance of pressure
from unions, the government, and, more generally,
employees, in the initial growth in paid vacation time
in Europe. In some countries, vacation laws mandating
a minimum number of vacation days played a key role
in the spread of vacation time. In others, collective23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
bargaining played the key role, with national legisla-
tion following.
In the latter half of the 1930s, both American and
European workers were typically granted an average
of one to two weeks of paid vacation, the difference
being that in the U.S., paid vacation was provided by
employers or negotiated through collective bargaining,
while in many European countries it was guaranteed
by law. In 1954, the International Labor Organization
(ILO) convention adopted a recommendation setting
more liberal standards for vacations with pay in member
countries than those first outlined in the 1936 conven-
tion. Many western European countries adhered to
this standard by passing new legislation concerning
minimum paid vacations.11
Although Americans and Europeans initially took
comparable amounts of paid vacation, trends in vaca-
tion time in the U.S. and Europe diverged in the decades
after World War II. In each decade of the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s, vacation time mandated by law in European
countries rose by an average of one additional week
per decade, while in the U.S. and the United Kingdom
vacation time continued to be determined solely on the
basis of employer policy or private labor union agree-
ments. By the late 1980s, workers in Finland, France,
Luxembourg, Spain, and Sweden enjoyed five weeks
minimum mandated paid vacation each year.12 This
divergent trend in vacation legislation is mirrored in
the trends of the amount of vacation taken in Europe
and the U.S. Throughout the postwar years, vacation
time in Europe grew, while growth in vacation time
taken by Americans slowed after the 1970s.13 This is
reflected in the fact that Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates of
annual hours for the U.S. actually show a slight growth
between 1979 and the late 1990s.14
The above discussion suggests that differences be-
tween Europe and the U.S. in trends in annual work
hours are associated with differences in paid leave from
work, but the history of vacation time leaves open the
question of whether vacation legislation has a causal
effect on annual hours worked. It is clear that in some
countries vacation legislation simply reflected develop-
ments in collective bargaining agreements. Even in these
cases, vacation legislation may have led to increased
vacation time for nonunion workers. No previous study
provides a quantitative analysis of the effect of vaca-
tion legislation on annual hours worked, the issue to
which we now turn.
Data and econometric specification
The sample of countries consists of the U.S., the
UK, Finland, France, Germany (West Germany prior
to 1991), Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
The hours data are average annual hours actually worked
per person in employment and are obtained from the
OECD. The data on vacation legislation in western
European countries are pieced together from Green
and Potepan (1988), Blyton (1985), Greis (1984),
Hewitt Associates (2001), and the ILO (1996).
We study the effects of mandatory vacation leg-
islation on vacation time by estimating variants of the
regression model
1) Annual Hours Workedct = α + β (Min_Vacationct)
+ γ (Year Dummiest) + λ(Country Dummiesc) + uct.
In the model, the variable Min_Vacation is the num-
ber of weeks of paid vacation mandated by law. The
coefficient β is the effect on annual hours worked of
an additional week of mandated vacation. The elements
of the coefficient vector γ on the year dummies cap-
ture the average difference between annual hours in
year t and the reference year (1979) that is due to other
factors that are common to all countries. The elements
of the vector of country-specific intercepts λ capture
the average difference in annual hours between the par-
ticular country indexed by c and the reference country,
which is the U.S. These differences are due to country-
specific factors that are fixed during the sample period.
They include culture and country-specific tastes, demo-
graphic characteristics, and financial incentives for work.
The variable uct is the error term. We report results
with and without the country and year dummies.
Because the data concerning vacation legislation
come from many sources, there may be some inconsis-
tencies in the measures across countries and over time.
For most of our analysis, the data on vacation laws are
for 1979, 1982, 1984, 1995, and 1999. For the years
1979, 1982, and 1984, the variable is a measure of legal-
ly mandated minimum weeks of paid vacation.15 In
the absence of information about law changes between
the years for which we have data, we assume that the
laws are in effect in two or three years after the year
for which we have data, as summarized in table 1.
For example, we set the law measure in 1980 and 1981
to the value in 1979. Due to lack of more complete data
on the laws, we set the law measure in 1996–99 to the
value observed in either 1995 or 1999 depending on




Column 1 of table 2 reports the estimates of
equation 1 with year dummies and country dummies24 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
excluded. The estimate of β is –26.8 (with a standard
error of 7.38). Taken at face value, the result says that
an increase in mandatory vacation time by one week
leads to a reduction in annual hours of 26.8.
In column 2, we add year dummies to control for
time-related changes affecting hours in all countries.
The coefficient on vacation weeks is –25.4 (7.70). Not
surprisingly, the coefficients on the year dummies
show a decline in annual hours worked since 1979.
In column 3, we control for both year dummies
and country dummies and use variation over time in
Min_Vacationct within countries to identify the effects
of the laws. The estimate of β is –51.9 (11.7). The re-
sults imply that an extra week of mandated vacation
results in a reduction in annual hours by more than one
full-time week and is within one standard error of a
reduction of one full-time week. This suggests that the
laws have bite, and that workers do not respond to
them by working more hours per week or by holding
additional jobs.17
As we noted earlier, dummy variables for each
country control for country-specific attributes, includ-
ing variations in work preferences and culture. Fixed
country differences account for a large part of the vari-
ance in hours in the sample, as evidenced by the in-
crease in adjusted R2 from .04 to .91 when we add the
country dummies. The coefficients on the country dum-
my variables tell how much workers in each country
would work, compared with workers in the U.S., hold-
ing vacation legislation constant. The positive coeffi-
cient for Spain suggests that in the absence of the
vacation laws, Spanish workers would actually work
more hours annually than U.S. workers. The negative
coefficients for Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and the UK suggest that workers in
those countries would work fewer hours annually than
U.S. workers even in the absence of vacation laws.
Note that the UK is one of the countries whose
workers would work less than those in the U.S. if there
were no vacation laws. The UK is the only country in
the sample other than the U.S. that currently does not
have vacation legislation. The analysis in Blyton
(1985) of the role of trade unions in the spread of paid
vacation time in the UK suggests that unions may
explain the negative country dummy in the UK. ILO
(1995) emphasizes the powerful role of unions in the
British economy during much of the postwar period.
To highlight the role of vacation laws in country
differences in hours, in column 4 of table 2 we drop the
vacation law variable from equation 1. The country co-
efficients rise substantially in absolute value, reflecting
the role of vacation laws in explaining the overall dif-
ference in annual hours between the U.S. and Europe.
Sensitivity checks
The vacation law variable might be picking up the
effect of differences between the U.S. and European
countries in trends in other factors that affect hours,
such as the age structure of the population and wages.18
A simple way to control for such factors is to add a
separate quadratic time trend for the U.S. to the mod-
el with vacation weeks, year dummies, and country
dummies. The trend variables are set to 0 in 1979. The
estimate of β, the coefficient on vacation weeks, falls
to –39.9 (11.2), and coefficients on the linear and qua-
dratic trend terms are 20.3 (10.2) and –.571 (0.48).
The trend coefficients indicate that everything else
equal, including vacation laws, annual hours were rising
in the U.S. relative to other countries by 20.3 hours
in 1979, but were actually declining by –2.54 hours
per year in 1999. We obtain –35.1 (11.7) as the estimate
for β if we allow for separate quadratic trends for the
U.S. and the UK or eliminate the U.S. from the sample.
When we eliminate both the U.S. and the UK from the
sample and thus estimate β using only within-country
variation in the laws for the countries that have laws,
the estimate declines only slightly to –34.1 (12.9). The
decline in the absolute value of the estimates of β when
we control for separate time trends for the U.S. and the
UK means that cross-country differences in trends in
other factors that influence hours and happen to be cor-
related with vacation law policy explain part of the link
between vacation laws and hours, but not most of it.
One of the limitations of the analysis is that the
number of changes in vacation laws after 1979 is rel-
atively small. Consequently, we augmented the sample
using data on annual hours for 1950 reported in Van
Den Bergh and Wittelsberger (1981) and data on man-
datory vacation weeks in 1954 from Green and Potepan
(1988). We exclude Spain in this year for lack of data.
The mean of the vacation law variable increased from
1.93 to 3.36 between 1954 and 1979. It only rose from
3.36 to 3.9 between 1979 and the late 1990s.
It is not entirely straightforward to use Van Den
Bergh and Wittelsberger’s data on hours with the
TABLE 1
Assignment of vacation laws to years
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) data. These authors report annual hours
for 1979 as well as 1950. To minimize the effect of in-
consistencies in their hours series and the OECD series,
we use the ratio of the 1979 values that they report to
the values from OECD to link the 1950 values to the
OECD series. Note that in using hours for 1950 with
the vacation laws in 1954, we are assuming that the
vacation laws were similar in the two years. In any event,
the estimate of β is –55.6 (11.3) using the extended
sample when we include country and year dummies,
which is close to, but a bit larger than, our previous
estimate.19 This provides support for the analysis based
on the post-1979 sample.
One should not make too much of the specific esti-
mates of the effects of the vacation laws or the country
dummies. Given that a substantial amount of vacation
time is offered in both the U.S. and the UK without
vacation laws, it is unlikely that the entire
amount of legislated vacation is binding
in its effect on vacation time taken or on
annual hours. However, the evidence does
suggest that vacation laws in Europe are
part of the explanation for the fact that
annual hours worked are lower there.
Conclusion
Jobs are hours–wage packages in
which employers circumscribe work hours.
There are good reasons to expect firms to
offer fixed hours/wage packages or per-
haps hours/wage menus that involve steep
tradeoffs and to limit variation in work
schedules and days off. There is abundant
evidence that they do so. There is also some
theoretical support for the view that the
menu of hours choices available to workers
is inefficient relative to what would pre-
vail if firms could easily observe produc-
tivity or could easily enforce multi-period
contracts, although there is no real evi-
dence on the importance of the problem.
Policies governing paid and unpaid
leave are important levers through which
firms set hours. In the U.S., leave policy
is largely determined by firm-wide policy,
despite heterogeneity in worker preferenc-
es. However, many countries have adopt-
ed laws mandating minimum vacation
leave. Our regression analysis of the rela-
tionship between vacation laws and an-
nual work hours for a cross-section time
series of countries suggests that such laws
do lead to a reduction in annual hours. We wish to
stress, however, that our study is a preliminary look at
the question of whether vacation laws influence hours
rather than the final word. It would be very useful to
expand the analysis to include more countries and a
longer period and to pay more careful attention to the
exact timing of the laws and their effects on hours. This
will require a substantial effort to obtain hours mea-
sures and measures of the law that are consistent
across time and place. Our use of country dummies
and time dummies goes part of the way to addressing
the concern that causality runs from work hours to the
laws rather than from the laws to the hours, but further
work looking at the political economy of the laws is
needed. Whether minimum vacation laws needlessly
restrict choice or solve a failure of the market to pro-
vide an efficient level of vacation is an open question.
TABLE 2
Effects of vacation laws on annual work hours
Dependent variable:
Annual hours worked OLS estimates
(standard errors in parentheses)
Explanatory variables 1 2 3 4



















United Kingdom –174.1 –174.1
(20.2) (22.2)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.040 0.910 .892
N 115 115 115 115
Notes: See text for a description of the sample and time period. Prior to 1991,
German data were for West Germany. The U.S. is the reference country. OLS is
ordinary least squares.26 3Q/2003, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1Legislation governing the work week also may influence differ-
ences in annual hours across countries. See Lehndorff (2000) for
a recent study of the evolution of a shorter work week in European
Union member countries. See Hunt (1999) and Crépon and Kramarz
(2001) for studies of the effects of laws mandating reductions in
the work week in Germany and France, respectively.
2See Killingsworth (1983), Pencavel (1986) and Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) for comprehensive surveys. Rosen (1976), Biddle
and Zarkin (1989), and Moffitt (1984) are early examples of labor
supply studies in which workers choose hours and wages accord-
ing to a market locus. Here, we draw heavily on the discussion in
Altonji and Usui (2001).
3See Heim and Meyer (2002) for a recent discussion of the im-
portance of fixed time and money costs in the determination of
work hours, as well as the difficulties that these and other sources
of nonconvexity pose for labor supply analysis.
4See Malcomson (1999), Gibbons and Waldman (1999), and Weiss
(1990) for surveys of this literature.
5Using a “rat race” model in which heterogeneity in preferences
is key, Landers et al. (1996) show that a mandatory reduction in
the hours of associates in law firms can improve welfare.
6See Allen (1969), chapter 3.
7See Allen, p. 90.
8See also Greis (1984), pp. 30–31.
9Henle (1962) provides information on the role played by collective
bargaining agreements in increasing paid vacation time in the U.S.
between 1940 and 1960. Green and Potepan (1988) study the ef-
fect of union membership on vacation time in the U.S. and Europe.
They provide evidence based on the 1979 cross section from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics that union members receive more
paid vacation than nonunion members, controlling for other char-
acteristics. Altonji and Usui (2001) find that male union members
receive .23 more weeks of paid vacation and take .39 more weeks
of vacation than nonunion members, controlling for education,
experience, job seniority, race, region, and city size.
10See Allen (1968), pp. 53–59.
11See U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1955,
pp. 88–89.
12See Green and Potepan (1988), pp. 180–184.
13For discussions in the popular press dramatizing the difference
in amount of vacation time taken by Europeans and the amount
taken by Americans, see Moseley (2000) and Robinson (2000).
14There is considerable controversy over the trend in work hours
in the U.S. Greis (1984) provides a detailed analysis of the U.S.
trend in annual hours and its components—weeks per year and hours
per week after 1947, as well as a literature review. She provides
reasonably strong evidence for a decrease in hours. Abraham and
Spletzer (1998) point out that there is a substantial discrepancy be-
tween the trend in hours implied by job-based surveys of employers
and the household-based Current Population Survey. The employer-
based data appear to show a decline in hours. See Schor (1991),
Kniesner (1993), and Stafford (1992) for differing views on trends
in work time and on whether Americans work more than the opti-
mal amount, given preferences and productivity.
15In some cases, we converted the data on mandated minimum
days of paid vacation to weeks by dividing by five.
16Furthermore, we use vacation law data from Germany for the year
2000 in our analysis for the vacation law in effect in Germany
during the years 1996–99.
17When we use the log of hours as the dependent variable, we
obtain a coefficient of –.023 (.0081).
18Bell and Freeman (2000) provide a careful study of the disparity
in hours worked by Americans compared with Germans. They find
that the greater hours worked by Americans are due to labor sup-
ply responses to differences in wage inequality between the two
countries. The theory is that extra work pays off more in the U.S.
in the form of promotions and salary hikes, generating more hours
worked. Such differences could lead to differences in both the level
and trend in hours, because wage inequality has increased in the
U.S. relative to most European countries. See Katz and Autor (1999)
for references to the inequality literature. Using the Luxembourg
Income Study, an international archive of datasets from industri-
alized countries, Jacobs and Gerson (2000) present evidence that
the rise in annual hours worked in the U.S. between 1970 and 1997
can be attributed to demographic shifts in the labor force. Specifi-
cally, they find that the increase in joint hours worked by dual-earner,
husband-wife families accounts for most of the increase in the
average for the U.S. They find that the working time of male-
breadwinner families and families headed by single women with
no husband present has not changed significantly.
19The estimate of β is –55.3 (11.7) when we extend the sample
using Maddison’s (1982) hours data for France, West Germany,
Italy, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S. for the years 1950 and 1979.27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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